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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2-(3)(j) and Rule
4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court follow the mandate of John

Call Engineering, Inc., vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d
1205 (Utah 1987)?
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing Manti, on

the day of trial and over the objection of Call, to amend
its answer and allege mitigation of damages?
3.

Did the trial court err by not granting Call

a continuance?
4.

Did the trial court commit reversible error when

it failed to submit Call's jury instructions?
5.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

allowing any irrelevant or prejudicial issues in the trial
proceeding?
6.

Did the trial court err in denying Call's motion

for a directed verdict and in denying Call's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative,
motion to amend the judgment, or in the alternative, motion
for a new trial?
1

7.

Did the trial court err in not taxing as costs

against Manti the expert witness fees incurred by Call?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules and regulations are attached in Respondent's
addendum in the addendum to Respondent's brief.
are:

They

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8; Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure 15; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 40; Utah Code
Annotated, Section 21-5-4 1953 (as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Sixth
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County awarding
the appellant John Call Engineering, Inc., ("Call") $13,440
plus pre-judgment interest based on stipulation to run
from January 1, 1984 and costs against the respondent
Manti City Corp. ("Manti") and a subsequent order denying
Call's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, or
in the alternative, motion to amend the judgment, or in
the alternative, motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

John Call Engineering sued Manti City for breach

of an engineering services contract.
2

2.

After a non-jury trial, Judge Tibbs entered a

judgment in favor of Manti.

Call appealed.

(R. 182,

183, 185 & 186. )
3.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed Judge Tibbs1

decision instructed him to determine Call's damages giving
careful consideration to mitigation and enter judgment
in favor of Call.

John Call Engineering Inc., v. Manti

City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Utah 1987).
4.

A second trial, this time before a jury, was

held. (R. 247-261. )
5.

Call made a Motion in Limine to limit or exclude

evidence and argument to the following issues:
(a)

Whether Call should be paid for work

not performed.
(b)

Whether the judgment would be paid

out of juror and/or taxpayer's pockets.
(c)

Whether Call mitigated his damages.

(R. 235-246.)
6.

The court denied the Motion in Limine but indicated

to counsel he could object during the trial.
its answer by alleging mitigation of damages.

Manti amended
(Transcript

of Proceedings, January 12 & 13, 1989 p. 67-73, hereinafter
Tr.)

The amendment did not prejudice Call.
3

7.

The court initially offered Call a continuance

of the trial.
8.

(Tr. 73.)

On reconsideration and upon case review the court

determined the case would proceed.
9.

(Tr. 75.)

Thereafter, the court allowed the issue of mitigation

of damages, (Tr. 182) pursuant to Supreme Court instruction.
10.

The original contract was introduced into evidence

by Appellant.
11.

(Tr. 211-212.)

The court instructed the jury on the meausre

of damages which included mitigation.
12.

The court repeatedly admonished the jury they

were only to consider the measure of damages to Appellant.
(Tr. 81, 82.)
13.

Appellants direct testimony ranged from $57,900.00

to $191,998.00 without consideration to any mitigation.
This inconsistancy was based on testimony offered by different
witnesses.
14.

On cross examination numerous inconsistancies

were revealed such as inspection fees, (Tr. 209) payment
of taxes, (Tr. 229), amounts paid and costs. (Tr. 232)
15.

Evidence was introduced showing net profits

ranged from 3 to 36% but averaged around 6%.
16.

Respondent called David Thurgood as an expert

witness.
4

17.

At the close of plaintiff's case, the plaintiff

moved the court for a directed verdict in the sum of not
less than $56,377.
18.

The court denied plaintiff's motion.

The court properly instructed the jury on law

to determine damages.
19.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Call

for $13,440.
20.

(R. 262.)

Call filed timely motions under Rule 50 and

59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure amended judgment
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the
alternative, motion for a new trial.
21.

(R. 276-294.)

The trial court denied Call's motion and denied

Call's request for expert witness fee costs. (R. 335-336.)
22.

Call appealed.

(R. 339-340.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED THE MANDATE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court in John Call Engineering Inc.
vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987) instructed
the lower court to determine Call's damages and enter
judgment in favor of Call.
The trial court instructed the jury on determination
of damages and repeatedly admonished the jury to only
5

consider damages.
The contract was introduced into evidence by Call
and consideration of the contract was essential in making
a determination of damages.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.
The court allowed Manti City to amend its answer
to allege the unpled mitigation of damages defense.

Likewise,

the court allowed Call to amend pleadings to increase
the amount of damages.
The amendment allowing consideration of mitigation
merely followed remand instructions.
Such an amendment in no way prejudiced Call.

Manti

City's trial conduct and strategy of only calling David
Thurgood as a witness and relying on cross examination
of Call witnesses made no difference in Calls preparation
for the mitigation defense.

Call was on notice based

on the remand instructions.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL.
Call was not prejudiced because there was really
nothing for Call to prepare for.
Because Call was not prejudiced by the courts denying
6

the continuance there was no abuse of the courts discretion.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
BY FAILING TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
The court adequately gave the jury instructions that
because Manti breached the contract, Call was entitled
to the amount of damages that would place him in the same
financial position as if he had completed the contract
and had been paid in full.
The court further instructed the jury that lost profits
could be awarded if they could be established from the
evidence.
The jury was properly instructed.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ALLOW MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND
PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY.
References by Manti City to the original contract
were not irrelevant or prejudicial.
introduced by Call.

An examination of the contract was

essential to determine damages.
were essential.

The contract was

Amounts paid to Call

The contract reference to inspection

was essential to determine damages.
POINT VI
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT
IN FAVOR OF CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR
AWARDED A NEW TRIAL.
7

Calls evidence in attempting to establish damages
was contradictory.
different amount.

Each witness called testified to a
Cross-examination further exposed the

lack of credibility of Calls witnesses.

Calls witnesses

failed to properly consider mitigation.
Call himself testified he did not know what the damages
were becaue he had not had time to calculate it.

The

$56,000 demand as a directed verdict does not give consideration
to the jurys view of the percent of profit evidence.
POINT VII
CALL SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED
HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE COSTS.
Utah statutes set forth the amount of witness fees.
Utah case law does not extend the award of witness fees
to include high expert witness fees.

Manti should not

be required to pay deposition costs and expert witness
fees of Ccills own witnesses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FOLLOWED THE MANDATE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to
follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court in Call's
post-appellate trial on damages.

In reality, however,

the court insured that the trial focused solely on the

8

issue of damages, and it expressly follow the directions
of the supreme court by considering mitigation evidence.
As noted below, the issue of mitigation in a contract
cause goes exclusively to the issue of damages.

Consequently,

the court not only follow the supreme court's express
mandate, it acted consistent with the rule that when damages
are at issue, mitigation is always a factor to be considered.
The jury was charged and instructed their only duty was
to determine damages.

Throughout the trial they were

admonished only to consider and determine damages.

(Tr.

81, 82)
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
Appellant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error when it allowed Respondent to amend its
answer at trial to allege mitigation of damages as a defense
to Appellant's damages claim at trial.

Appellant claims

that Respondent's motion to amend was tardy and therefor
should not have been granted.

Under Rule 15 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the trial court has
broad discretion to grant parties leave to amend their
pleadings, and "leave shall be freely given when justice
so requires."

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a).

9

Moreover, there is nothing wrong with moving to amend
pleadings at trial to conform to the evidence.
of Civil Procedure Rule 15(b).

Utah Rules

Appellant iself, took

advantage of this rule to move to amend its complaint,
even later in the trial, to increase the amount of damages
prayed for.

(Tr. 312)

Mutuality and justice demand equal

treatment of both sides.

Consequently, Appellant should

not be able to attack Respondent's motion to amend while
advocating its own.

It was well within the trial court's

discretion to grant Respondent's motion to amend its answer
to include the issue of mitigation, particularly when
tbe trial

focused solely on the question of damages and

the Utah Supreme Court had directed the trial court to
consider mitigation.

John Call Engineering Inc. vs. Manti

City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1210, (Utah, 1987) (Orme,
J*, concurring) (specifically directing the trial court
ta carefully scrutinize Appellant's damages, including
evidence of mitigation. )
Call claims that mitigation of damages is a defense
wlich must be affirmatively pled under Rule 8 of the Utah
Riles of Civil Procedure.

Appellant cites several cases

tt support its conclusive proposition that failure to
aSf irmatively plead mitigation in the first instance waives
a defendant's right to assert the defense foreverafter.
10

Appellant places the greatest emphasis on Gill vs. Timm, 720
P.2d 1352 (Utah, 1986).

Counsel claims that in Gill,

the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that the failure
to plead mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense,
waives any mitigation of damages issue at trial.

(Appellant's

brief p. 14). Not only does counsel misconstrue the holding
in Gill, he completely ignored the case of Price-Orem
Inv., Co., vs. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah,
1986), in which the court specifically held that failure
to plea mitigation does not result in an automatic waiver
of the defense.

See Price-Orem 713 P.2d at 59.

Moreover,

Gill can be distinguished from the instant case because
it involved a pure tort claim instead of a contract dispute
or even a contract-like dispute.

More importantly, in

both Gill and Pratt vs. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294,
(Utah, 1977), (another case relied upon by Appellant),
not only did the defendants fail to plead mitigation as
a defense, they also failed to introduce any evidence
on that issue at trial.

The Gill court specifically noted

that despite the defendant's failure to plead mitigation,
if he had presented evidence 0£ argument on that issue
at trial "he might have been entitled to a post-trial
amendment to his answer under Rule 15(b) to include mitigation
11

of damages as an affirmative defense," in accordance with
the court's earlier ruling in Price-Orem.

Gill vs. Timmf

720 P.2d at 1354 (citing Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 58-59;
other citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In this case Respondent moved to amend its Answer
to include the affirmative defense of mitigation prior
to the trial on damages.

Respondent concedes that it

did not assert the issue of mitigation at the first trial
-- concerning the contract's validity -- because damages
were not at issue.
validity.

Mitigation is not a defense to contract

Evidence of mitigation goes strictly to the

issue of damages; it is not used to dispute or undermine
the validity of a contract.

Hence, because the

trial

court found the contract invalid, it would have been illogical
for Respondent to address mitigation at the first trial.
Because damages were not at issue, and Respondent had
not need to counter Call's damage claim with a mitigation
argument.
Appellant claims that it was prejudiced when the
trial court granted Appellant's motion to amend, because
Call was surprised and had insufficient notice and opportunity
to prepare for that defense.
made a similar argument.

Plaintiffs in Price-Orem

The court found, however, that

the claims of surprise and lack of notice were without
merit because both the pleadings and opening statements
showed that plaintiff was "clearly aware that the issue
12

of damages was the central one."
at 59, supra.

Price-Orem 713 P.2d

The court held that under such circumstances

defendant was not precluded from introducing evidence
on mitigation.

In this case Appellant obviously knew

(or had reason to know) that the Respondent might assert
mitigation as a defense to Call's damages claim.

That

fact is clearly evidence by Call's own Motion to Limine
to exclude argument and evidence on mitigation.

Moreover,

the supreme court's opinion and directions clearly put
Call on notice that mitigation would be considered on
remand. See John Call Engineering vs. Manti City Corp./
743 P.2d at 1210 (Orme, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Such obvious constructive notice should preclude Appellant
from claiming surprise or prejudice.
Appellant makes a great deal of the fact that the
trial court first granted a continuance, then changed
its mind.

(Appellant brief pp. 15-16, 18-21.)

fails to explain why the court changed its mind.

Appellant
In an

attempt to persuade the court not to grant the motion
to amend during preliminary proceedings in chambers. Appellant's
counsel handed the court a copy of the case Gill vs. Timm,
720 P.2d 1352, and asserted that it was dispositive of
the issue at hand.

(Tr. 67)

After looking at the case,

however, the court noticed that Gill is distinguishable
13

(as noted above), and therefore not controlling.

More

importantly, the court had taken the opportunity to refresh
its understanding of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion
and directions for remand in this case on its first appeal.
John Call Engineering vs. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205
(Utah, 1987), (Tr. 72-76).

After taking a closer look

at the court's directions, the court reasonably concluded
that the supreme court specifically directed him to look
at all issues bearing on damages, including mitigations.
(Tr. 76)
Although Appellant claims that the amendment prejudiced
its position, Call could not have been prejudiced because
instead of producing numerous witnesses or evidence of
its own regarding mitigation, Respondent's trial strategy
relied on cross examination of Appellant's own witnesses.
It is difficult to conceive of anything else Appellant
could have done to prepare for Respondent's case on mitigation.
John Call testified about other jobs his company had after
the contract was repudiated.

(Tr. 242-258)

Charles Peterson

testified as to Call's potential capacity to generate
revenue.

(Tr. 268-82)

The testimony of both witnesses

should have been the same regardless of whether or
not mitigation was at issue.

Appellant's apparent
14

lack of preparation was manifest only with regard to the
amount of actual damages incurred (Tr. 231-237); see also
Appellant's brief at 6 (claiming either $191,998 or $136f334,
or $70,278 or $57 f 990).

Consequently, Call's claim of

prejudice and lack of notice is groundless.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL
Call claims that the trial court erred in failing
to continue the trial.

Appellant is correct in noting

that the general proposition that a continuance should
be granted if substantial prejudice will result from going
forward.

As noted above, however, Appellant's assertion

that Call was prejudice is hollow.

Appellant anticipated

the defense of mitigation, and had adequate opportunity
to prepare for it.

Moreover, based on Respondent's trial

strategy more intense preparation would have been of little
consequence.
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure grants
trial courts substantial discretion in deciding whether
or not to grant a continuance.

See Christensen vs. Jewkes,

761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah, 1988).

Consequently, the standard

of review is very high and the trial court's decision
should be reversed only for clear abuse of discretion.
See Id. at 1377.

Call emphasizes the fact that the court

seriously considered granting a continuance, then changed
15

its mind.

As noted above, however, the court had good

cause to change its mind after reading Gill vs. Timm,
720 P.2d 1352, re-examining the supreme court's instructions
for remand in John Call Engineering vs. Manti City Corp.,
743 P.2d 1205, and balancing the consideration involved
in granting Respondent's motion to amend.
67, 72-76.

See Tr., at

The court clearly weighed the important factors,

including adequacy of notice and potential for prejudice,
as well as judicial economy, delay, and other concerns
relevant to the decision of whether or not to grant a
continuance, and acted with a reasonableness that was
well within its discretion.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR
BY FAILING TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing
to give several of its requested jury instructions regarding
calculation of damages.

(Appellant's brief pp. 21-25.)

The issue on review, however, should not be whether the
trial court failed to give all of Appellant's instructions,
concededly, all were not given.

The issue is whether

or not the instructions the court gave were adequate.
In evaluating challenged jury instructions, the instructions
must be considered as a whole.
237 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah, 1951).
16

See Startin vs. Madsen,
Even when a trial court

refuses substantively correct jury instructions, if the
court covers the substance of the law in its own instructions
viewed as a whole, they are adequate.
Thurman 239 P.2d 215, 219 (Utah, 1951).

See Hardman vs.
Moreover, "[t]he

instructions should not be susceptible of misconstruction
as either comments on the evidence or arguments for either
side of the case."

Startin, 237 P.2d at 836.

In this

case, Appellant clearly attempted to provide commentary
through several of its proposed jury instructions.

The

trial court reasonably denied them on the basis of argumentativeness and duplication.

See Tr. at 307-11.

Consequently,

the court adequately discharged its duty to cover the
theories of both parties and fairly present the issues
to the jury.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred particularly
in failing to give its special verdict form and requested
instructions on calculation of lost profits.

In a very

recent case, however, the Utah Supreme Court, held:
"[sjpecial verdicts and interrogatories are both
matters within a trial court's discretion. . .
In the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion,
the trial court's action will not be disturbed."
Canyon Country Store vs. Bracey, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,
22-23 (1989), (citations omitted.)
IN Bracey, the defendants (like the Appellant in
this case) argued that the complexity of the case "mandated
the use of specific interrogatories or verdicts in order
17

to help the jury enter a rational verdict."

_Id_. at 23.

The court observed, however, that:
,f

[a]| jury does not necessarily have to state directly
how it resolved every important issue in a case to
arrive at a rational and fair verdict." Ld. at 23.
(citations omitted)
the court further observed that while the case was complex
in some respects (involving breach of an insurance contract
and resultant damages), the jury did not appear to be
overwhelmed by issues and evidence "as might have been
the case in a convoluted antitrust or securities regulation
matter."

Id_.

The court therefore held that their instructions

were not prejudicial, but

rather adequately assisted

the jury in sorting out the issues.

In this case, Appellant's

special verdict form was likewise unnecessary.
Moreover, Appellant's proposed instructions were
unduly lengthy, complex and repetitive.

While Respondent

concedes that calculation of damages was inherrently difficult
(based on Call's confusing evidence), compounding the
complexity with complex jury instructions was not necessarily
the solution.

In many cases, everyday common sense is

more valuable than complex, incomprehensible formulas.
One need look no further than the testimony of Appellant's
legion of experts for a good illustration of this point.
The supposed purpose of expert testimony is to assist
the jury in resolving the issues before it.
18

In this case,

however, the experts' testimony was of arguably little
assistance in this regard because although they all used
complicated

mathematical formulas, margins and percentages,

they arrived at substantially different figures, ranging
from $57,900 to $191,998.

(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)

The jury could not have avoided being confused by the
experts1 testimony and that confusion would have only
been compounded by Appellant's requested jury instructions.
Furthermore, if, as asserted above, consideration of mitigation
was proper, Appellant's requested jury instructions on
calculation of damages included no provision for taking
it into consideration.

Appellant steadfastly maintains

that the only correct measure of damages in this case
is Call's lost profit on the project at issue.
added)

E.g. Appellant's brief at 21-28.

(emphasis

In reality,

lost profits or expectation damages constitute the very
most liberal recovery possible in any contract action.
This rule is a matter of hornbook law, so elementary that
reference to supporting authority is unnecessary.
In Utah Farm Production Credit Assn. vs. Cox, 627
P.2d 62, 64 (Utah, 1981), the court said:
"Where a contractual agreement had been breached
by a part thereto, the aggrieved party is entitled
to [only] those damages what will put in as good
19

as position as he would have been had the other party
performed pursuant to the agreement. . . the aggrieved
party may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate
the injury occasioned by the breach, but has a duty
to mitigate his damages." Id_. at 64.
By seeking to preclude consideration of mitigation,
and basing the measure of damages in this case solely
on the profits lost on this project, Appellant attempts
to recover a windfall.

(emphasis added)

Because Manti

breached the contract Call was undisputedly able to accept
and earn profits from other projects which Call in fact
did.

Appellant is not satisfied with the position it

would have been in if the contract had not been breached,
however.

It seeks to recover the profit it might have

earned on this project as well as retain the profits earned
on other projects.

While Appellant is quick to cry

"prejudice"

to its own cause, it is more than willing to impose prejudicial
burdens on Respondent.

Appellant's position is therefore

grossly unreasonable and should not be condoned.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ALLOW MANTI TO PRESENT
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL ISSUES
AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY
Appellant contends that the trial court allowed Respondent
to present irrelevant and prejudicial issues and arguments
to the jury.

Call claims that Respondent presented evidence

that the contract was in dispute; that Call was paid for
everything he did; that Call could not proceed without
20

written authority; and that the taxpayer's would have
to pay Call.

(Appellant's brief p. 27.)

are completely baseless, however.

These assertions

In response to Respondent's

attempted to present evidence that even approached these
issues Appellant vigorously objected, and the court repeatedly
sustained Appellant's objections and carefully instructed
the jury as to the evidence.
into trial.

Call introduced the contract

Some consideration of the contract was essential

to the determining of damage such as what had been paid
to Call and the inspection provision of the contract.
The record is devoid of prejudicial statements that taxpayers
would have to pay.
POINT VI
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT
IN FAVOR OF CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR
AWARDED A NEW TRIAL
Appellant claims that the trial court either should
have directed a verdict for at least $56,000 or awarded
a new trial.

Appellant bases this argument on the fact

that the jury disagreed with its asserted damage figures
and awarded Call even less than the least amount calculated
by any of Call's witnesses.

This should not have come

as a complete surprise, however, because the jury was
instructed to take mitigation into consideration, while
Call's witnesses did not.

Assuming, (pursuant to the
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discussion presented above), that mitigation evidence
was appropriate for the jury's consideration, the jury
could have very reasonably taken the $56,000 figure, subtracted
the $22,000 which Call had already received from Respondent,
coupled with a deduction for mitigation to arrive at $13,440
verdict.
The jury also may have reduced the verdict because
of doubts as to the credibility of Call's witnesses and
the figures they presented. It certainly would have been
difficult to overlook the fact that there were substantial
differences between each of the experts1 figures.

In

addition to Call's confusing and contradictory evidence
on damages, neither Call himself, nor any of his witnesses
would establish that Appellant actually lost money during
the relevant time period.

See Tr. at 243, 285.7.

In

fact the jury easily could have drawn an inference from
the evidence that despite Respondent's breach, Appellant
went on to accept and do other work which put Call Engineering
in just as good (or nearly as good) a position as it would
otherwise have been.

It clearly is within the prerogative

of the trier of fact to assess credibility of witnesses
and choose between conflicting evidence.

See Sorensen

vs. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 830-31 (Utah App., 1989).
Consequently, the jury reasonably may have concluded that
Call's case was not as clear-cut as Appellant believed
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it to be.
Appellant emphasizes the fact that Respondent put
on very little affirmative evidence to rebut Call's damage
figures and claims that its own evidence was uncontroverted.
Even the trial court was concerned about this.

(Tr. 315-16)

In Dairylanl Ins. Co., vs. Holder, 641 P.2d 136 (Utah,
1982), the plaintiff raised similar concerns.

"It characterize[d]

defendant's evidence as 'mere scintilla' based on speculation
and inferences."

W_. at 138.

The court found, however,

that the defendant's evidence "constituted more than 'mere
scintilla' and the jury reasonably could have reached
its verdict based on defendant's evidence, notwithstanding
plaintiff's testimony concerning his actions and motives.
Id. at 139.

In the instant case, Respondent relied on

the testimony of David Thurgood and rigorous cross examination
to reveal inconsistencies in Appellant's evidence and
challenge the credibility in assertions.

If there is

any evidence upon which the jury could reasonably base
its finding, it should stand.
at 138.

See Dairyland, 641 P.2d

Consequently, upon viewing the jury's verdict

in light of reasonably inferences that can be drawn from
the evidence presented at trial, the verdict must stand.
POINT VII
CALL SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED
HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE COSTS
Appellant argues completely contrary to Utah law
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that Call should be awarded costs for his expert witness
fees.

Utah appellate courts, however, repeatedly have

held that expert witness fees in excess of the statutory
rates (U.C.A. 21-5-4), are not reimbursable "costs."
See Frampton vs. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah, 1980);
Sorensen vs. Sorensen, 69 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah, 1989);
Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah App. 1988).
Appellant concedes this and admits that its argument is
contrary to current Utah law, but argues that the current
law is illogical and should be overturned.

(Appellant's

brief p. 41.)
Appellant relied on Highland Construction Co., vs.
Union Pacific Railroad Corp., 683

P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1984),

to supports its fees at trial, because under the extraordinary
circumstances of the Highland case, the court awarded
costs for expert depositions.

In Highland, the court

found that aware justified because of the complexity of the
case.

While Appellant emphasizes the complexity of the

instant case, it is not nearly as complex as Appellant
tried to make it appear.

Appellant also fails to recognize

the difference between awarding costs for expert fees
at trial, as opposed to deposition costs.

In Highland

the costs awarded did not exceed $2,500 while in this
case Appellant is claiming almost $10,000.
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Appellant

duplicated expenses in this case by deposing its experts
and calling them to testify at trial as well.

Counsel

was obviously aware of the added expense this would cause,
as well as the near certainty that such expenses would
not be recoverable as costs.

Respondent should not be

penalized for Appellant's inefficient handling of the
case.

It also should be noted that since Highland, the

Utah Court of Appeals has emphasized that despite the
necessity of incurring the expense of expert witness fees
in the preparation of litigation, they are not chargable
as costs.

See Stevens 754 P.2d at 959.

Appellant bemoans the fact that if costs are not
awarded for expert witness fees almost all of its $13,440
verdict will go to experts.

An identical argument was

asserted in a very recent Utah Court of Appeals case.
See Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City vs. Dasakalas,
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 70, (Utah App. 1989).

Plaintiffs in

that case lost their property to condemnation.

They argued

that they had been deprived of constitutionally mandated
just compensation:
"because they [had] been required to expend a considerable
portion of their award which was founded on the
fair market value of their property, for the services
of expert witnesses and other reasonably necessary
litigation expenses." Ld. at 76.
In response, however, the court concluded that "expert
witness fees are not reimbursable 'costs1 and upheld
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the trial court's refusal to aware compensation for expert
witness fees incurred to establish the value of the property.
Id. at 77.

Despite the court's apparent sympathy for

plaintiffs1 position, it deferred to the legislature for
an adjustment of the law.

See Id.

Consequently, Appellant's

fervent plea for an award of costs to cover its expert
witness fees is unpersuasive.

If the law should be rewritten,

this certainly is not the case for it.
CONCLUSION
The only issue to be considered by the jury was to
determine damages.
only charge.

The jury was admonished this was their

The jury was properly instructed concerning

damage determination.
Call was not prejudiced by either allowing amended
pleadings to permit mitigation of damages given the supreme
court's instructions or the court's failure to grant a
continuance.
The trial on damages was not tainted with irrelevant
or prejudicial issues or statements.
The evidence presented in its contradictory nature
does not support a directed verdict, a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or a new trial.
Accordingly, this court should affirm the lower court.
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ADDENDUM

Rule 8

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am Jur 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders ^ 1 et seq., 61A Am. Jur 2d
Pleading §§ 1 et seq , 238
C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motions and Orders k 1
et seq , 71 C J S Pleading ^§ 63 to 210, 140 et
seq., 211 et seq
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A L R 3 d 1361

Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A L R 3d 1113
Key Numbers. — Motions «=» 1 et seq.;
Pleading «= 38V2 to 186, 187 et seq

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief, A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain ( D a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter22
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Rule 8

native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially the same as Rule 8, F R C P
Cross-References. — Amended and supplemental pleadings, Rule 15
Arbitration, § 78-31 a-1 et seq
Comparative negligence, § 78-27 38
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Rule 13
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1
et seq
Defenses and objections, Rule 12
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim,
§§ 78-3-16 5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14, Appx G, Code
of Judicial Administration
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2
Form of pleadings, Rule 10
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and
brevity of statement, Rule 84
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, Rule
12(d)

Interpleader, Rule 22
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23 to 24
Numbered paragraphs, Rule 10(b)
One form of action, Rule 2
Reply to answer, order for, Rule 7(a)
Secunty
interest,
enforceability
of,
§ 70A-9-203
Special forms of pleadings and writs abolished, Rule 65B(a)
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq
Statute of frauds, investment securities,
§ 70A-8-319
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial
Code, personal property not otherwise covered,
§ 70A-1-206
Third-party practice, Rule 14
Time for answer, Rules 3(b), 12(a)
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affirmative defenses
—Accord and satisfaction
Pleading
Time limitation
—Consent
—Election of remedies
—Estoppel
Failure to plead
—Failure of consideration
Failure to plead
Pleading
—Failure to plead
Affidavit opposing summary judgment
Denial
Notice and opportunity
Waiver of defense
—Fraud
Necessary allegations
—Mitigation of damages
Failure to plead
Pleading
—Mutual mistake
—Statute of frauds
Motion to dismiss
Pleading

—Statute of limitations
Applicability to plaintiffs
Pleading
Waiver
—Waiver
Claims for relief
—Amendment of pleading
—Attorney fees
—Essential allegations
Alienation of affections
—Request for alternative relief
—Sufficiency of complaint
Attachment of exhibit
Found not sufficient
Found sufficient
Liberal construction
Consistency
—Double recovery
—Election between claims
—Election of remedies under contract
—Res judicata
—Separate claims
Contract and quantum meruit
Defenses
—Lack of consideration
Purpose of rules
Cited
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Rule 15

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —- 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
§ 188 et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84.
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution

or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A.L.R.4th 338.
Key Numbers. — Parties «=> 49 to 56.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 15, F.R.C.P.
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Rule 40

Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) m such
other manner as the courts may deem expedient Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon
good cause shown If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the adverse
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the
trial, and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and
(B)].
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amendment of Rule 32, effective January 1, 1987, the
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule
32(c)(3)(A) and (B)

Subdivision (a) of this rule is similar to Rule
40, F R C P
Cross-References. — Amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, continuance upon,
Rule 15(b)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Postponement
—Absence of party
—Discretion of court
—^Inability of counsel to attend tnal.
Unavoidable absence
—New theory of case
—Procedural delays
—Supporting affidavits
—Unavailable witness
Lack of diligence
Need
Cited
Postponement.
—Absence of party.
Continuance would not be granted because
of absence of a party, unless he was a material
witness, and, if so, the facts expected to be
proved by him had to be stated under oath,
unless the oath was waived It was also neces

sary that party had used due diligence to be
present at the tnal McGrath v Tallent, 7
Utah 256, 26 P 574 (1891)
Refusal of tnal court to postpone tnal was
not abuse of discretion where case was set
down for tnal, and had once before been continued because of absence of party who was
pnncipal witness, and second continuance was
sought by attorney who was not of record in
case Lancino v Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P
914 (1909)
Refusal to grant continuance in personal injury case was an abuse of discretion where
plaintiff was not able to attend the tnal because of his physical condition, there was no
evidence of malmgenng by the plaintiff, and
the plaintiffs testimony was essential to his
case Bairas v Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373
P 2d 375 (1962)
—Discretion of court.
Denial of motion for continuance was within
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21-5-4

FEES

separate line item appropriation contained in the appropriation to the Judicial Council.
(2) If expenses exceed the line item appropriation, the administrator of the
courts shall submit a claim against the state to the Board of Examiners and
request the board to recommend and submit a supplemental appropriation
request to the Legislature for the deficit incurred.
History: C. 1953, 21-5-1.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 153, § 5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 153

became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

21-5-4. Witness fees and mileage.
(1) Every witness legally required or in good faith requested to attend a
circuit or district court, or a grand jury, is entitled to $17 per day for each day
in attendance and if traveling 50 miles or more, 25 cents for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going only.
(2) If a witness is attending from outside the state in a civil case, mileage
for him is allowed at the rate of 25 cents per mile and taxed for the distance
actually and necessarily traveled inside the state, in going only,
(3) If the witness is attending from outside the state in a criminal case, the
state shall reimburse the witness under Section 77-21-3.
(4) If a witness is attending from outside the county but from within the
state in a civil case or criminal case, mileage for him is allowed at the rate of
25 cents per mile and taxed for the distance actually and necessarily traveled,
in going only.
(5) A prosecution witness or a witness subpoenaed by an indigent defendant
attending from outside the county but within the state may receive reimbursement for necessary lodging expenses under rule of the Judicial Council.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 994; L.
1911, ch. 9, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2545; L. 1925,
ch. 96, § 1; R.S. 1933, 28-5-4; L. 1937, ch. 30,
§ 1; C. 1943,28-5-4; L. 1951, ch. 41, § 1; 1977,
ch. 98, § 1; 1988, ch. 152, § 10; 1989, ch. 153,
§ 6.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1988 amendment,
effective April 25,1988, divided the former section into Subsections (1) and (2); substituted "a
circuit" for "upon a city" following "attend" in
Subsection (1); added Subsection (3); and made
minor stylistic changes.

The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, in Subsection (1), substituted "$17" for
n
$14" and substituted "if traveling 50 miles or
more, 25 cents" for "30 cents"; inserted "at the
rate of 25 cents per mile" in Subsection (2); and
added Subsections (4) and (5).
A.L.R. — Requirements, under Rule 45(c) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule
17(d) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
relating to service of subpoena and tender of
witness fees and mileage allowance, 77 A.L.R.
Fed. 863.

21-5-4.5. Allocation of food allowance costs for jurors.
(1) Jurors serving in a criminal action in district and circuit court may be
provided with reasonable food allowances at the expense of the state under the
rules of the Judicial Council.
(2) When a jury in a criminal action in the district and circuit court has
been placed in sequestration by order of the court, the necessary expenses for
food and lodging shall be provided at the expense of the state under the rules
of the Judicial Council.
(3) These provisions also apply to any jury trial held in the juvenile court.
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